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In 1953, a twenty-seven year old man underwent brain surgery
to treat the severe epilepsy that had plagued him during his youth.1
The surgeon, Dr. William Scoville, removed portions of the young
man's brain that were involved in memory processing. Most notably,
Dr. Scoville removed most of his patient's hippocampus. 2 The surgery
left the young man, now known to psychologists as H.M., with
anterograde amnesia: he still had a short-term memory, but he was
unable to convert any of his short-term memories into new long-term
memories. 3 Although H.M. could not form new long-term memories,
psychologists found that he still could learn some new skills. For
instance, researchers had H.M. complete repeated trials of the Tower
of Hanoi puzzle, which challenges participants to rearrange three to
five blocks of increasing size on vertical pegs according to certain
rules.4 H.M. had no conscious recollection of completing the Tower of
Hanoi puzzle in earlier trials, but his performance nevertheless
improved with practice. 5 H.M.'s mystifying improvement can be
explained by the influence of "implicit memory," and a wealth of
subsequent research with nonamnesiac participants demonstrates
that implicit memory influences the actions of everyday people. 6
Implicit memories are memories that influence an individual's
behavior even though the individual is not aware of their influence.7
1. William Beecher Scoville & Brenda Milner, Loss of Recent Memory After Bilateral
Hippocampal Lesions, 20 J. NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 11, 16 (1957).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 17.
4. Neal J. Cohen et al., Different Memory Systems Underlying Acquisition of Procedural
and Declarative Knowledge, in MEMORY DYSFUNCTIONS: AN INTEGRATION OF ANIMAL AND HUMAN
RESEARCH FROM PRECLINICAL AND CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES 57, 61 (David S. Olton, Elkan Gamzu,
& Suzanne Corkin eds., 1985). The tower of Hanoi task consists of three vertical pegs and three
to five blocks of increasing size that fit over the pegs. "In the initial configuration, all of the
blocks are on the leftmost peg with the largest block on the bottom and the smallest one on the
top. The goal ... is to move all the blocks.., to the rightmost peg ... in the same order ....
[Plarticipants can move only one block at a time, and they can never place a larger block on top
of a smaller one." Yaoda Xu & Suzanne Corkin, H.M. Revisits the Tower of Hanoi Puzzle, 15
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 69, 69-70 (2001).
5. Xu & Corkin, supra note 4, at 70 ("After several days of testing, all the amnesic
participants, including H.M., were reported to be able to learn the recursive strategy and to solve
the puzzle consistently in the near minimum number of moves, like the [normal control
patients.]"). Studies with other amnesics and later studies with H.M. produced mixed results. Id.
at 70, 72.
6. See infra Part III.
7. Xu & Corkin, supra note 4, at 69 ("[N]ondeclarative or implicit memory refers to the
influence of previous experience on task performance without conscious referral to stored
information, that is, learning without awareness.").
1904 [Vol. 61:6:1903
2008] UNCONSCIOUS COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
For example, imagine that you attend a summer camp as a child and
develop a secret handshake with your roommate at the camp. The
next summer, you return to the camp. When you see your roommate
from the previous summer, he extends his hand. At this point, you
may consciously recognize that he wants to do the secret handshake,
recall when and how you developed the handshake, and then perform
the handshake step by step with reference to your memory. This is an
example of explicit memory: you are aware that you are reconstructing
the handshake with reference to an episodic memory from the
previous summer. However, you may reach out and perform the
handshake without thinking about the previous summer at all. This is
an example of implicit memory: you are able to perform the
handshake correctly, but you do not consciously refer to any memory
of the previous summer. Implicit memory is relevant to copyright law
because, just as an implicit memory of a handshake might influence
future handshakes, implicit memories of songs, pictures, and phrases
might influence a creator as she produces her own music, painting, or
story.
Implicit memory "is likely involved in instances of
unintentional plagiarism,"" or unconscious copying. Unconscious
copying9 occurs when a creator is familiar with an original,
copyrighted work, and this familiarity leads the creator to produce a
work similar to the original without ever recognizing the influence or
its source. 10 Presently, copyright law treats unconscious copying no
differently than conscious copying-both deliberate and inadvertent
copiers are liable for copyright infringement. This Note argues that, in
light of the empirical research establishing that implicit memory
influences human behavior, the present approach to unconscious
copying is at odds with psychological realities and is inconsistent with
the fundamental purposes of copyright law.
Copyright law generally protects creative works from
unwanted plagiarism. In cases of conscious copying, the application of
copyright law is straightforward and well-grounded because it makes
8. DANIEL L. SCHACTER, SEARCHING FOR MEMORY: THE BRAIN, THE MIND, AND THE PAST
171 (1996).
9. Courts often use the term "subconscious" to describe this sort of copying, while
psychologists researching implicit memory and processes favor the term "unconscious." Modern
experimental psychologists have largely discarded the concept of the subconscious, favoring the
view that there is a singular unconscious system. In the context of this Note these terms are
interchangeable-both subconscious and unconscious refer to those memories and processes that
influence people below the level of awarenes-but I use the more widely accepted "unconscious."
10. See Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) ("On the whole, my
belief is that, in composing the accompaniment to the refrain of 'Kalua,' Mr. Kern must have
followed, probably unconsciously, what he had certainly often heard only a short time before.").
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sense for the law to discourage deliberate misappropriation of the
works of others. However, the appropriate application of copyright law
is less clear in the context of unconscious copying. Unconscious copiers
cannot be discouraged or deterred, as by definition they are not aware
that they are copying. Because the risk of liability for unconscious
copying is out of authors' conscious control, it creates a disincentive for
creative expression. Furthermore, truly unconscious copiers also are
not morally accountable in the same sense as conscious copiers, as
unconscious copiers do not intend to misappropriate and must labor to
create their works in the same way that independent creators do.
However, independent creators are fully protected from liability for
copyright infringement, whereas unconscious copiers are liable.11
Courts in their discretion may "reduce the amount of damages,
especially statutory damages" due to "innocent intent," but,
nevertheless, the unconscious copier is potentially liable in full for
infringement. 12
This approach leaves creators in a potentially precarious
position. For example, imagine that you are a painter having a
difficult time deciding what to paint. Over several months, you start a
variety of different paintings but never get far before deciding to
abandon the work and start a new project. Finally, an idea comes to
you, a complete vision for you to pursue. You paint frantically, each
stroke leading smoothly into the next, until the whole of your ideas is
expressed on the canvas. You are proud of the fruits of your labor and
you end up selling your work for a nice sum. Months later, though, you
are blindsided by a copyright infringement suit that another artist
files against you; this artist briefly displayed a similar painting at a
local gallery a year earlier. If you never saw the other artist's painting
in the gallery, copyright law does not hold you liable because you are
an independent creator. But, if you took one glimpse at the other
artist's painting over a year ago' 3 and never gave it another conscious
thought, you may be fully liable for copyright infringement. 14
Unfortunately, in the latter scenario you are a victim of implicit
11. See Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 482 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
Michael Bolton liable on the theory of subconscious copying for infringement on an Isley Brothers
song released over twenty years earlier and finding that "[s]ubconscious copying has been
accepted since Learned Hand embraced it").
12. Susan Somers Neal & Lisa A. Iverson, Copyright Litigation and Strategies, in
UNDERSTANDING BAsIc COPYRIGHT LAW 287 305 (2002) (citing Bright Tunes Music Corp. v.
Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)).
13. As will be discussed infra Part III, the strength of implicit memories may not vary with
changes in depth of processing or divided attention as the strength of explicit memories does.
14. Liability will depend on the extent of the similarity, infra Section II.B.
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memory, or more precisely, of the application of copyright law to
implicit memory situations.
Part II of this Note describes the elements of a successful
copyright infringement suit and identifies the elements most pertinent
to the issue of unconscious copying. Part II also discusses the two
primary aims of copyright law: promoting creative expression and
protecting creators' moral rights in their work. Part III surveys
psychological research on implicit memory, examines some of the
contexts in which its influences can be observed, and considers the
implications for copyright law. Together, Parts II and III provide the
tools used to evaluate legal approaches to unconscious copying later in
the Note.
Part IV examines three noteworthy cases 15 to illustrate how
courts presently approach unconscious copying. A close examination of
case law reveals that courts hold both unconscious and conscious
copiers fully liable. This Part also outlines the development of the
current approach and highlights some of the reasoning courts use to
justify it. Part V then proposes a new approach to unconscious
copying, which is referred to as the "rebuttable presumption
approach." Under this approach, unconscious copying functions as a
defense to copyright liability, but courts may rely on a rebuttable
presumption that the copying was conscious. This Part proceeds to
compare the rebuttable presumption approach to the current approach
and evaluates each in terms of how well it comports with the
overarching purposes of copyright law discussed in Part II, how well it
comports with the psychological understanding of implicit memory
discussed in Part III, and how practical it is for courts to administer.
Finally, Part VI offers some concluding remarks on the way copyright
law should deal with unconscious copiers.
II. COPYRIGHT LAW & UNCONSCIOUS COPYING
A. The Two Aims of Copyright Law
When evaluating how copyright law treats unconscious
copying, it is important to keep in mind the overarching objectives of
copyright law. Roughly speaking, copyright law has two primary aims:
to incentivize people to create and to ensure that creators get the
rights to their works that they (morally) deserve for the labor they
15. Three Boys Music Corp., 212 F.3d 477; Bright Tunes Music Corp. 420 F. Supp. 177; Fred
Fisher, Inc., 298 F. 145.
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expend. 16 In the United States, the purposes of copyright law typically
are described in economic terms: 17 Copyright law is a tool used by the
government to incentivize individual citizens to be creative, securing
for society the benefit of these creators' works.' 8
In a world without copyright protection, pirates are free to
make and distribute copies of authors' original works. Pirates in this
world consistently undercut the authors' prices because pirates do not
have to recoup invested labor as the original authors do. 19 If authors,
songwriters, and other creative individuals must expend time and
resources to create new works but cannot count on a reasonable return
for their efforts because of copiers, then authors have little incentive
to continue in their creative endeavors. 20 By legally protecting the
rights of original authors of creative expressions21 from infringement,
copyright law gives would-be creators a reason to persist in their
creative efforts.22 Using copyright law primarily to incentivize creators
comports with the language of the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution, which grants Congress authority to "promote the
progress of Science and the Useful Arts."23
Using copyright law to promote creativity is a balancing act. To
make the creative process economically worthwhile, authors need
16. Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors' Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and
Morality of French and American Law Compared, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 554-
55 (2006). While the American system of copyright law emphasizes economic incentives, the
French system places emphasis on moral rights in addition to economic ones. Id.
17. Id. at 554.
18. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' ").
19. See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1659, 1700 (1988) (finding that the nature of ideas as "public goods" will "create a risk that
inventions and works of art that would be worth more to consumers than the costs of creating
them will not be created because the monetary incentives for doing so are inadequate"); William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325,
332 (1989) (finding that without copyright protections, "[t]here would be increased incentives to
create faddish, ephemeral, and otherwise transitory works because the gains from being first in
the market for such works would be likely to exceed the losses from absence of copyright
protection").
20. See Landes & Posner, supra note 19, at 327 ("For a new work to be created, the expected
return ... must exceed the expected cost.").
21. This includes the right of the author to distribute his creative work for profit.
22. See Landes & Posner, supra note 19, at 332 (describing the consequences to expression
due to lack of copyright protection); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-
Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 493-94 (1996) (describing the controls that copyright
protection impose on later authors).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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legal rights in their creative expressions.24 However, if copyright
protection were granted too broadly, the terms of copyright protection
were too strict, or the duration of copyright protection were too long,
then copyright protection could have a chilling effect on creative
expression.2 As more creative expressions fall within the scope of
copyright protection, there are fewer creative expressions from which
a creator may freely draw. 26 Potential authors, fearing copyright
liability, may reduce their creative output.27 Copyright law must limit
the sorts of expression that can be copyrighted and the terms and
duration of these copyrights. 28 The concept of "public domain,"29 for
instance, limits the term for which a creative work is copyrighted to
seventy years after the death of the author.30
While American courts tend to describe copyright law in terms
of its economic function, there is an important alternative justification
grounded in moral rights.31 The notion underlying the moral account
of copyright is that the one who invested the labor to create a work is
its rightful owner.32 The argument runs as follows:
Labor is mine and when I appropriate objects from the common I join my labor to them.
If you take objects I have gathered you have also taken my labor, since I have attached
my labor to the objects in question. This harms me, and you should not harm me. You
therefore have a duty to leave these objects alone. Therefore I have property in these
objects. Similarly, if I use the public domain to create a new intangible work of
authorship or invention, you should not harm me by copying it and interfering with my
plans for it. I therefore have property in the intangible as well .... 33
24. See Landes & Posner, supra note 19, at 328 (finding that in the absence of copyright
protections, the work "probably will not be produced in the first place, because the author and
publisher will not be able to recover their costs of creating the work"); Lunney, supra note 22, at
494-95 (finding that copyright law can "insulate an author's work from effective price
competition, provide the author with a degree of market power with respect to copies of her work,
and increase the price the author can profitably charge for access to her work").
25. COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 7 (Julie E. Cohen et al. eds., 2002).
26. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 975-77 (1990) (arguing
that a large public domain is necessary for artists to thrive).
27. Id. at 1018 (arguing that, in the absence of public domain, "[a]uthors could no longer
safely give free rein to their subconscious minds, and their muses would need to be available for
deposition").
28. COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY, supra note 25, at 7.
29. The public domain is the class of existing creative works from which authors are free to
draw in creating their own works, as opposed to the class of existing creative works protected by
copyrights.
30. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
31. Piotraut, supra note 16, at 554-55.
32. Id. at 555.
33. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in
the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1544-45 (1993).
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European countries, particularly France, generally favor the
idea that copyright protection is a moral requirement rather than
simply a useful tool for stimulating creativity.34  The moral
justification has some relevance in the American legal system.35 For
instance, the Visual Artists Rights Act (V.A.R.A.) recognizes certain
moral rights of visual artists, including a right of attribution and a
right to "prevent the use of his or her name as the author ... in the
event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification ... which would
be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation."36
Both the economic and moral justifications of copyright law are
useful for the purposes of this Note. Any changes made to copyright
law as it exists now ideally would incentivize more creative expression
and comport with notions of fairness regarding authors' rights to their
works.
B. The Anatomy of a Copyright Infringement Claim
The Intellectual Property Clause, Article I, Section 8 of the
U.S. Constitution, grants Congress the power to "promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."37 Congress codified copyright law in Title 17 of the U.S.
Code pursuant to the power expressly granted in the Intellectual
Property Clause. 38 Whenever an author creates a work that is entitled
to copyright protection under the statute, a bundle of rights akin to
property rights vests in the author.3 9 If someone infringes on an
author's rights, the author can file a copyright infringement action
against the infringer.
To establish a prima facie case of copyright infringement, a
plaintiff must show that (1) she owns a valid copyright for the work
34. See COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY, supra note 25, at 11; Piotraut,
supra note 16, at 554-55 ("[I]n civil law countries such as France, the more individual-centered
droit d'auteur system gives special importance to the principles of natural justice.").
35. See Piotraut, supra note 16, at 558 ("Notwithstanding a more materialistically-oriented
copyright system, authors hold a central place in American copyright law as well.").
36. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
38. COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY, supra note 25, at 3.
39. Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 970 (1990). The Copyright Act
grants all protected authors exclusive rights to (1) reproduce the work, (2) prepare derivative
works based on the work, and (3) publicly distribute the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). For some
categories of works, authors also have exclusive rights to publicly display or perform the work.
Id.
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and (2) the defendant copied protected elements of the work.40 It often
is difficult to find direct evidence of copying because the works at issue
in copyright cases typically come from internal creative processes, and
a judge cannot peer into the thoughts of a creator to discern her
inspiration.41 In the absence of direct evidence of copying, courts
typically infer that the defendant copied the plaintiffs work if the
plaintiff sufficiently demonstrates that (1) the defendant had
reasonable access to the copyrighted work and (2) the two works are
"substantially similar."42
Courts do not treat the requirements of reasonable access and
substantial similarity as independent and conjunctive. Rather, access
and similarity are evaluated relative to one another under an "inverse
ratio rule."43 That is, the higher the degree of access to the material
the plaintiff demonstrates, the lower the degree of similarity the
plaintiff must demonstrate to persuade the court to infer copying. 4
4
Likewise, the lower the degree of access present, the higher the degree
of similarity courts require.45 Furthermore, even if a plaintiff offers no
proof at all that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work,
courts still may infer copying if the plaintiff demonstrates that the two
works at issue are "strikingly similar" and the defendant has no
satisfactory explanation for why the works are so similar.
46
The plaintiff can show that the defendant had reasonable
access to the copyrighted work in one of two ways. First, the plaintiff
may present evidence specifically establishing "a particular chain of
events.., between the plaintiffs work and the defendant's access to
that work (such as through dealings with a publisher or record
company)." 47 Alternatively and more frequently, the plaintiff may
present evidence that the work was widely disseminated to the public;
for instance, in the musical context, a plaintiff may show that her
40. Neal & Iverson, supra note 12, at 302 (citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelly Info. Pub'g, Inc. 999 F.2d
1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc)).
41. Litman, supra note 39, at 1015 ("It is difficult to ascertain the source of an idea and
impossible to prove its provenance in any meaningful sense. A court cannot unzip an author's
head in order to trace the genealogy of her motifs; indeed, the author herself usually cannot pin
down the root of her inspiration.").
42. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 2000); Neal & Iverson,
supra note 12, at 303-04.
43. Three Boys Music Corp., 212 F.3d at 485.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.; Neal & Iverson, supra note 12, at 304 (citing Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 903 (7th
Cir. 1984)).
47. Three Boys Music Corp., 212 F.3d at 482.
1911
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"work was widely disseminated through sales of sheet music, records,
and radio performances." 48 If a work was sufficiently disseminated,
then it is likely that the defendant encountered the work at some
point and later, either consciously or unconsciously, copied it from
memory. The defendant's access to the plaintiffs work must be
"reasonable," meaning that the mere possibility of access is not
sufficient. 49 The "reasonable access" analysis is one of two components
of a copyright case in which the issue of unconscious copying may
arise. 50 Unconscious copiers will contest the access issue because they
often do not recall having access to the original work. 51 If the
defendant does not recall accessing the work, the case turns upon how
widely the work was disseminated. If the work was disseminated
widely, then the defendant likely was exposed to it, and unconscious
copying becomes the most likely explanation for the similarity.
If the plaintiff shows that he has a valid copyright and that the
defendant copied the protected material, either with direct evidence of
the defendant's copying or by proving a sufficient combination of
reasonable access and substantial similarity, the defendant faces
liability unless he successfully invokes one of several defenses. The
relevant defense for the purposes of this Note is "independent
creation."52
C. The Independent Creation Defense
Independent creation is a complete defense against liability for
copyright infringement. 53 Once a plaintiff proves reasonable access
and substantial similarity, the defendant has an opportunity to
demonstrate that she independently created the work at issue, free
from the influence of the plaintiffs work. 54 Unconscious copiers are
48. Id. (quoting 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE § 8.3.1.1.,
at 91 (1989)).
49. Neal & Iverson, supra note 12, at 304 (citing Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 903 (7th Cir.
1984)).
50. The other is the independent creation defense, discussed in Section II.C.
51. See Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (discussed in
Section IV.A), and Three Boys Music Corp., 212 F.3d at 483-84 (discussed in Section IV.C), for
examples of cases where parties accused of copyright infringement claimed that they never had
access to the original work. A defendant, however, may recall accessing the original work after
the similarities are pointed out to them or suit is filed. See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v.
Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); infra Section IV.B).
52. Neal & Iverson, supra note 12, at 306.
53. Id.; see Repp v. Webber, 858 F. Supp. 1292, 1303-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (granting summary
judgment to defendant Andrew Lloyd Webber based on evidence of independent creation).
54. See Repp, 858 F. Supp. at 1303 (noting that a defendant accused of copyright
infringement can "rebut the inference of copying" by showing that his product was independently
1912 [Vol. 61:6:1903
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likely to raise the independent creation defense because, by definition,
an unconscious copier will believe that she has created her expression
independently. 55
The independent creation defense furthers the aims of
copyright law under both economic and moral requirement accounts.
First, copyright law should incentivize creators to produce creative
works.56 If a defendant's creation truly is independent of the plaintiffs
copyrighted work, then at the time of creation the defendant was not
aware that the plaintiffs copyrighted work existed, or at least was not
familiar with the contents of the copyrighted work. Holding
independent creators liable likely would have a chilling effect on
creative output, as creators potentially would be liable for similarities
to any other copyrighted work in the world, even those the creator
never encountered. Thanks to the independent creation defense,
creators theoretically can be confident that if they create their works
independently, they are safe from liability for infringement and
actually are entitled to their own copyrights for the works.57 Copyright
protection can be available to two separate authors for two identical
works if in fact they were independently created.58
Second, the independent creation defense is consistent with the
moral justification of copyright law. According to the moral
justification of copyright law, creators are entitled to both pecuniary
and moral rights in their creations because the creations are the
product of their labor. 59 If a creator does not copy another work, but
creates her work independently, then the labor she invests in creating
a work is the same regardless of whether a substantially similar
copyrighted work already exists. Therefore, independent creators are
entitled to the same degree of copyright protection as original authors.
Unconscious copying is closely related to the independent
creation defense, as unconscious copying arguably resembles, and is
perhaps indistinguishable from, 60 independent creation. Unconscious
copiers generally attempt to defend themselves from copyright
liability by refuting the "access" element in the plaintiffs prima facie
created); Gund, Inc., v. Applause, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 304, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that
defendants can "rebut the inference of copying by showing that its product was independently
created despite its similarity to plaintiffs work.").
55. See, e.g., Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 486 (9th Cir. 2000).
56. Landes & Posner, supra note 19, at 327; Lunney, supra note 22, at 494-95.
57. Neal & Iverson, supra note 12, at 304-05.
58. Id.
59. Piotraut, supra note 16, at 555.
60. Professor Jessica Litman advances an argument along these lines in Litman, supra note
39, at 1008-12.
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case or by raising the independent creation defense. 61 So far, courts
have refused to give effect to the independent creation defense in cases
of unconscious copying. 62 On a literal level, this makes sense.
Unconscious copying does not result in "independent creations"
because unconscious copiers, by definition, pull from existing works.
However, drawing a distinction between unconscious copiers and
independent creators implicates an underlying assumption of
American copyright law: the law employs what one scholar terms a
"romantic model of authorship," attributing all of the creative efforts
to the individual author and minimizing the role of external or
unconscious influences. 63 Scientific research suggests that this model
of authorship may be flawed.
III. IMPLICIT MEMORY & COPYRIGHT
It is "well established in the field of cognitive neuroscience"
that implicit and explicit memories are stored by "two functionally and
anatomically separable long-term memory systems." 64  Explicit
memory includes semantic memory (memories of one's knowledge 65)
and episodic memory (memories of one's experiences 66). Implicit
memory includes motor skills, priming, and both associative and
nonassociative learning. Implicit memories are part of the
"unconscious" in that they are able to affect behavior while remaining
outside of awareness. 67
The most shocking demonstrations of the influence of implicit
memory come from cases involving amnesia, epilepsy, and intellectual
61. See, e.g., Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 484-86 (9th Cir. 2000)
(analyzing the defendant's claims that he did not have access to the copyright material and that
he independently created the work).
62. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Creation, and Context, 41
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477, 479-80 (stating that the courts in the George Harrison and Michael
Bolton cases and courts more generally rely on "incomplete theories of creativity and processes of
creation" when using the theory of unconscious copying to impose liability).
63. '"The idea that subconscious copying occurs rarely and only at the margin springs from a
fancy that I term the 'romantic model of authorship. According to the romantic model, creative
processes are ... likely to produce unique expression .... [T'he real author is using words,
musical notes, shapes, or colors to clothe impulses that come from within her singular inner
being.... What the unconscious disgorges is no mere recasting of preexisting material, but
something wholly new." Litman, supra note 39, at 1008-09.
64. Xu & Corkin, supra note 4, at 70.
65. For example, trivia facts (i.e. the capital of Australia is Canberra) are semantic
memories.
66. For example, remembering seeing a kangaroo during a trip to Australia is an episodic
memory.
67. Howard Shevrin & Scott Dickman, The Psychological Unconscious: A Necessary
Assumption for All Psychological Theory?, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 421, 423 (1980).
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disabilities, 68 as these disorders provide researchers with a unique
dissociation of explicit and implicit memory. 69 For instance, although
amnesiacs do not perform as well as nonamnesiacs on standard,
explicit memory tests, they perform equally well in implicit tasks,
such as word stem completion. 0
The influence of implicit memory is not limited to those with
memory disorders. Implicit memory also influences ordinary people
with fully functional memories. Philosophers such as Descartes have
described unconscious mental processes for centuries, and in the
context of modern psychological research, implicit memory is but one
of many manifestations of the active, unconscious mind.71 Cognitive
psychologists recently have begun to study and explain the
unconscious processes associated with memory. 72 The results tend to
confirm that implicit memory influences behavior in a variety of
settings.
The distinction between implicit and explicit memory can be
observed by examining the different procedures used to test each. In
one paradigm for researching explicit memory, researchers tell
participants to study a list of words, making it clear that they will be
asked to remember those words after some interval of time has
passed. 73 Then, researchers measure participants' explicit memory by
measuring the number of words the participants can recall or by
providing a new list of words and measuring how many of them the
participants correctly recognize from the first list. The key is that
68. E.g., Janet Fletcher & Clare Roberts, Intellectual Disabilities, in IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT
MENTAL PROCESSES 343, 343-56 (Kirsner et al. eds., 1998); Elizabeth C. Leritz et.al., Temporal
Lobe Epilepsy As a Model to Understand Human Memory: The Distinction Between Explicit and
Implicit Memory, 9 EPILEPSY & BEHAVIOR 1 (2006); Schacter, supra note 8, at 167-69.
69. For instance, Amir and Selvig report patients diagnosed with diverse illnesses, such as
schizophrenia or Korsakoffs syndrome, show intact implicit memory when compared to control
groups while their explicit memory systems are substantially degraded. Nader Amir & Amy
Selvig, Implicit Memory Tasks in Clinical Research, in COGNITIVE METHODS AND THEIR
APPLICATION TO CLINICAL RESEARCH 153, 153-71 (David C. Rubin & Amy Wenzel eds., 2005).
70. Dawn M. McBride, Methods for Measuring Conscious and Automatic Memory: A Brief
Review, 14 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 198, 200 (2007). Word stem completion tasks are discussed
infra.
71. Perceptual psychologists, for instance, have routinely described unconscious processes
such as depth cue scaling, Richard L. Gregory, Distortion of Visual Space as Inappropriate
Constancy Scaling, 199 NATURE 678 (1963), and assimilation, Alexander W. Pressey, An
Extension of Assimilation Theory to Illusions of Size, Area, and Direction, 9 PERCEPTION &
PSYCHOPHYSICS 172 (1971). Moreover, these unconscious mental processes appear linked to
normal brain activity. Theodore B. Jaeger, Assimilation and Contrast in Geometrical Illusions: A
Theoretical Analysis, 89 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 249 (1999).
72. Daniel Schacter, Implicit Memory History and Current Status, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 501, 503 (1987).
73. McBride, supra note 70, at 200.
1915
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
subjects "are instructed to intentionally retrieve items from the study
episode to complete the test."74
In implicit memory research, researchers also expose
participants to a list of words, but generally the researchers do not tell
participants that they will be tested later on their recollection of the
words.7 5 For example, assume a word list includes the words banana,
monster, and carriage. After some interval of time passes, researchers
often will administer both an explicit memory test and an implicit
memory test. For the implicit memory test, subjects complete a task
"with no reference made to the study episode."76 A common task in
implicit memory tests is word completion: participants are given word
fragments, such as "b a --..... " " o _ st _," or"_ ar _ _ a ge," and
the researchers ask them to complete these fragments with whatever
word comes to mind.77 The word stems can be completed in multiple
ways: "barges," "lobster," and "marriage" are alternatives in our
example. Participants, however, complete the fragments with words
from the original list more frequently than chance predicts, even if the
participants do not recall or even recognize the words in the explicit
memory test. 78 Amazingly, results on explicit memory tests and
implicit memory tests are unrelated across a variety of experimental
paradigms. 79 This has tremendous import to copyright, as it means
that human behavior can actually be influenced by memories of which
we are not even aware.
Implicit memory affects pictures as well as words.80 That is,
when researchers conduct an implicit memory test and ask
participants to complete picture fragments rather than word
fragments, participants still demonstrate priming effects.81 Imagine
that Gary is a sketch artist who has recently examined the work of
another artist, Henry. If Henry's work is relatively simple and the
first few lines of Gary's sketch resemble part of it, then Gary may be
inclined to complete his sketch such that it resembles that of Henry







80. See, e.g., Yael M. Cycowicz et al., A Developmental Trajectory in Implicit Memory is
Revealed by Picture Fragment Completion, 8 MEMORY 19 (2000) (finding priming effects when
participants were asked to complete picture fragments rather than word fragments).
81. Id.
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Implicit memory of words and pictures can impact an
individual's behavior even if she is not consciously aware of the words
and pictures when they are originally presented to her. Researchers
have found that surgical patients under some types of anesthesia are
influenced by words presented to them while they are unconscious.8 2
For instance, in 2004, a group of researchers played a repeating series
of fourteen words through headphones to surgical patients under a
certain type of anesthesia.8 3 The patients were not conscious during
anesthesia and did not explicitly recall the words upon recovery.8 4 Yet
when the researchers used stem completion tasks to assess implicit
memory on recovery, they found that the patients completed
fragments with the fourteen words from the list more frequently than
chance predicts.8 5
Relevant for the creative arts, implicit memory also plays a role
in the learning and arranging of abstract sequential structures. A
study by Professors Thomas Goschke and Annette Bolte illustrates
this point with respect to semantic sequences.8 6 Goschke and Bolte
asked participants to name individual objects, like a table or a shirt.8 7
The semantic categories of the objects (e.g. furniture or clothing) were
organized in a repeating sequence. 8 Participants were slower at
naming objects when the pattern of presentation varied from the
repeating sequence, whether or not the participants were informed of
or recognized the sequence. This result suggests that participants had
implicitly learned and adapted to an abstract sequential structure.8 9
The relevance of this implicit influence to copyright law
becomes clearer when the experiment focuses on musical, rather than
semantic, sequences. In a similar type of study, researchers Gustav
Kuhn and Zoltan Dienes had participants listen to series of tunes.
Some of the tunes were "grammatical," meaning that they were
arranged according to grammatical rules like inverting and repeating
82. See, e.g., C. Deeprose et al., Learning During Surgery with Propofol Anaesthesia, 92





86. Thomas Goschke & Annette Bolte, Implicit Learning of Semantic Category Sequences:
Response-Independent Acquisition of Abstract Sequential Regularities, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL






notes, and some were not.90 Participants in the experimental group
listened to "training" tunes, all of which followed grammatical rules,
whereas participants in the control group did not hear any "training"
tunes.91 In a series of experiments, participants listened to various
tunes, grammatical and nongrammatical, and were asked about their
preferences. 92 The researchers found that the participants in the
experimental group implicitly acquired knowledge of their
grammatical structure, as exposure to the grammatical training tunes
influenced their subsequent preferences in nontraining trials.93 This
result suggests that preferences among musical structures may be
influenced by implicit learning and memory. If the creative choices of
people selecting, arranging, or composing music are influenced by
implicit memory, then resulting similarities may lead to liability for
copyright infringement under current copyright law.
Interestingly, implicit memory differs from explicit memory in
that there do not appear to be level-of-processing or divided-attention
effects associated with implicit memory. 94 "Level-of-processing effects"
refers to the tendency of people to remember items that they study
deeply better than items that they study at only a superficial level.95
"Divided-attention effects" refers to the tendency of people to
remember items upon which they focus all of their attention better
than items that they observe while multitasking. 96 Neither of these
effects is consistently present in the implicit memory context. 97
Returning to the example of the painting, it may be the case that one
is equally prone to unconsciously copy another artist's painting
whether one glimpsed it briefly or studied it for an hour.
Implicit memory is a relatively new but exciting area of
psychological research that has real implications for the law. Although
the research reviewed does not address the temporal scope of implicit
influence-that is, how long after exposure to a stimulus implicit
90. Gustav Kuhn & Zoltan Dienes, Implicit Learning of Nonlocal Musical Rules: Implicitly





94. McBride, supra note 70, at 201.
95. See, e.g., Anjali Thapar & Robert L. Greene, Effects of Level of Processing on Implicit
and Explicit Tasks, 20 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 671 (1994)
(describing level-of-processing effects).
96. See, e.g., Angela K. Troyer & Fergus I.M. Craik, The Effect of Divided Attention on
Memory for Items and Their Context, 54 CANADIAN J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 161 (2000)
(describing how multi-tasking negatively affects memory).
97. McBride, supra note 70, at 202.
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memories continue to impact behavior 98 -it does demonstrate that
words, images, and musical patterns can influence an individual's
behavior even if she is not aware of the influence. Professor Daniel
Schacter, a leading researcher in implicit memory at Harvard, has
connected the influence of implicit memory to inadvertent copyright
infringement.9 9 As psychologists continue to research implicit memory,
the scope and significance of the relationship between implicit
memory and copyright law will only become clearer.
IV. THREE CASES OF UNCONSCIOUS COPYING
A. The Beginning: Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham
The first case to address expressly the issue of unconscious
copying was Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham in 1924.100 A popular song
called "Dardanella" was frequently sung and played until its
popularity faded around the end of 1920.101 "Dardanella" opened with
a repeating eight-note sequence of accompaniment known as an
ostinato.10 2 Shortly after "Dardanella" faded from popularity, a light
opera number titled "Kalua" became tremendously popular. 10 3 "Kalua"
used precisely the same eight-note sequence from "Dardanella" as an
ostinato accompanying the chorus.10 4 The composer of "Kalua" swore
that he did not engage in conscious plagiarism, and Judge Learned
Hand was "on the whole ... disposed to give him the benefit of the
doubt."'10 5 Judge Hand noted that the composer of "Kalua" already was
established in opera, so it would make little sense for him to gamble
his reputation on deliberate piracy.106
98. Concededly, experimental research does not yet, to my knowledge, demonstrate implicit
influences years after exposure to stimuli. Conducting research to this end may be impracticable
because of the time period the research would have to span. However, Professor Schacter reports
a finding of "just as much priming on [a] word-fragment completion test after a week as there
was after an hour," and suggests that implicit influence may occur long after exposure to a
stimulus. Schacter, supra note 8, at 167, 171.
99. Schacter, supra note 8, at 171.
100. 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
101. Robert Rogoyski, The Melody Machine: How to Kill Copyright, and Other Problems with








Judge Hand began his opinion by framing the issue in terms of
the independent creation defense. 107 He observed that "the law
imposes no prohibition upon those who, without copying,
independently arrive at the precise combination of words or notes
which [sic] have been copyrighted."10 8 Therefore, for the court to hold
the composer of "Kalua" liable for infringement, it had to find that
"Dardanella" was the source of the ostinato accompaniment.10 9
Judge Hand reasoned that "everything registers somewhere in
our memories, and no one can tell what may evoke it."110 He explained
that, in composing "Kalua," the composer probably unconsciously
"followed what he had certainly often heard only a short time before."
However, Judge Hand concluded that the fact that the composer
unconsciously followed the pattern from "Dardanella" was enough to
find the composer liable for infringement:
The author's copyright is an absolute right to prevent others from copying his original
collocation of words or notes, and does not depend upon the infringer's good faith. Once
it appears that another has in fact used the copyright as the source of his production, he
has invaded the author's rights. It is no excuse that in so doing his memory has played
him a trick. 1 1 1
Judge Hand therefore held the composer of "Kalua" liable for
copyright infringement and established the foundation for copyright
law's current approach to unconscious copying.
B. Extending Liability for Unconscious Copying: Bright Tunes Music
Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd.
Fifty-two years after Fisher, the Southern District of New York
handled another case dealing with the issue of unconscious copying:
Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd.112 Former Beatle
George Harrison recorded "My Sweet Lord" in 1970.113 He was sued
because of the song's uncanny resemblance to the Chiffons' 1962 hit
song "He's So Fine."'114 "He's So Fine" consists of two musical motifs
with a grace note added in one repetition of the second motif.' 15 While





111. Id. at 148.
112. 420 F. Supp. 177, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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combination of the two motifs is unique.116 Harrison's "My Sweet
Lord" consists primarily of the same two motifs. In addition, the
identical grace note from "He's So Fine" is in one repetition of the
second motif.117 Harrison acknowledged that he had heard the
Chiffons' song. 118 "He's So Fine" had, after all, been widely
disseminated: it had reached number one on the Billboard charts in
the United States and had been one of the top hits in England.119
While Harrison acknowledged his familiarity with "He's So
Fine," he denied any deliberate plagiarism. In fact, Harrison offered a
detailed description of how he and gospel singer Billy Preston
developed "My Sweet Lord" independently and organically. 120
Harrison testified that, while in Denmark, he began writing "My
Sweet Lord" by singing the phrases "Hallelujah" and "Hare Krishna"
over some improvised strums of the guitar. 121 Harrison conferred with
the rest of his tour group that included Preston, developed the idea
while on tour, and finalized all of the relevant aspects of the song (the
two motifs and the grace note) in a London studio. 122
The court found that neither Harrison nor Preston consciously
plagiarized the theme of "He's So Fine."123 The court recognized,
however, that the two songs are musically identical except for one
phrase. 124 The court concluded that, as the composer was playing with
multiple possible combinations of notes, "there came to. . . his mind a
particular combination that pleased him... Why? Because his
unconscious knew it already had worked in a song his conscious mind
did not remember." 125 After stating that it did not believe Harrison
deliberately copied the Chiffons' song, the court held Harrison liable
for copyright infringement, reasoning that "[t]his is ... infringement
of copyright, and is no less so even though unconsciously
accomplished."1 26 As a legal matter, Harrison copied the Chiffons' song
and was liable for it, just as if he had done so deliberately. The court
affirmed the principle that Judge Hand announced in Fisher fifty-two
116. Id. at 178 n.3.
117. Id. at 178.
118. Id. at 179.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 179-80.
121. Id. at 179.
122. Id. at 179-80.
123. Id. at 180.
124. Id. at 180-81.
125. Id. at 180.
126. Id. at 180-181.
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years before, extending it to cover a six-year period between the
original song and the unconscious copy.127
C. The Modern Approach: Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton 128
Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton "goes even farther down the
road of unconscious copying," rendering findings of unconscious
copyright infringements more likely. 129 The Isley Brothers wrote,
recorded, and received a copyright for "Love is a Wonderful Thing" in
1964.130 The song was released in 1966, never reached the Top 100,131
and had limited radio play and success. 132 In 1991, singer Michael
Bolton released a similar pop song with the same title.133 At trial, the
jury found that Bolton had infringed on the Isley Brothers' copyright
for the original "Love is a Wonderful Thing".134
The Isley Brothers based their access argument on widespread
dissemination. 135 Unlike George Harrison in Bright Tunes, Bolton did
not concede his familiarity with the original song.136 In contrast with
Fisher, in which the unconsciously copied work appeared shortly after
the original, in this case the allegedly copied work came out twenty-
five years after the original. 137
The Isley Brothers offered four ways in which Bolton could
have accessed their version of "Love is a Wonderful Thing".138 First,
the Isley Brothers argued that Bolton grew up listening to and singing
the songs of black rhythm-and-blues singers like the Isley Brothers,
and specifically pointed to Bolton's testimony that his brother had a
"pretty good record collection."139 Second, three radio disc jockeys
testified that the Isley Brothers' "Love is a Wonderful Thing" was
widely disseminated in the time and area in which Bolton was
growing up. 140 Third, Bolton conceded that he was a fan of the Isley
127. Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
128. 212 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2000).
129. Rogoyski, supra note 101, at 420.
130. Three Boys Music Corp., 212 F.3d at 480.
131. Id. The song did, however, appear in Billboard's "Bubbling Under the Top 100" at
number 110. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 481.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 482-83.
136. Id. at 483.
137. Id. at 484.
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Brothers and had collected their music, though he never admitted
hearing "Love is a Wonderful Thing".141 Finally, when recording his
version of "Love is a Wonderful Thing," Bolton was recorded
wondering aloud if he was composing Marvin Gaye's "Some Kind of
Wonderful," demonstrating Bolton's awareness that part of his work
may have drawn from some other source. 142
Bolton's counsel contended that "the Isley Brothers' theory of
access amounts to a 'twenty-five-years-after-the-fact-unconscious
copying claim,' " and the court conceded that the case for reasonable
access and unconscious copying was more attenuated than in previous
cases. 143 However, the court held Bolton liable on the theory of
unconscious copying. 144
V. AN ALTERNATIVE: THE REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION APPROACH
Courts treat unconscious copying the same as deliberate
copying, holding unconscious copiers liable for copyright
infringement. 145 Courts allow evidence of the defendant's access to the
plaintiffs work and the degree of similarity between the two works to
substitute for evidence of copying in fact. 146 If a defendant had access
and the works are similar, it is immaterial whether the copying
author was aware of the copying. 147 Furthermore, courts may be
increasingly willing to hold unconscious copiers liable despite long
delays between the alleged access and the copying. 14 In Fred Fisher,
the copied work was produced shortly after the original. 149 In Bright
Tunes, six years passed between the widespread dissemination of
"He's So Fine" and Harrison's composition of "My Sweet Lord," but
141. Id. at 483-84.
142. Id. at 484.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 484-85.
145. Arewa, supra note 62, at 479-81; Stephen E. Roth, Get A Grip on Intellectual Property
Litigation: Learning the Fundamentals Through Song, Stage and Screen: Part I Copyright, 39
TENN. B.J. 16, 18 (2003); see, e.g., Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 482-83 (9th
Cir. 2000) (finding the theory of subconscious copying "embraced" since 1924 is still "applied" in
"modern cases"); Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 181
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("[Ilnfringement of copyright . . . is no less so even though subconsciously
accomplished."); Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) ("[A]uthor's
copyright is an absolute right to prevent others from copying.., and does not depend upon the
infringer's good faith.").
146. Three Boys Music Corp., 212 F.3d at 481; Neal & Iverson, supra note 12, at 303-05.
147. Fred Fisher, Inc., 298 F. at 148.
148. Three Boys Music Corp., 212 F.3d at 483.
149. Fred Fisher, Inc., 298 F. at 147.
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Harrison conceded access, and the court still found Harrison liable.1 50
In Three Boys, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit applied the theory of unconscious copying to a work that was
written twenty-five years after the original, which allowed the theory
of unconscious copying to do most of the work in establishing Bolton's
liability despite the fact that Bolton never admitted to hearing the
original Isley Brothers' song.151 This trend increases the number of
existing copyrighted works that creators must check in order to be
certain of avoiding liability for unconscious copying. Under Fred
Fisher, a modern musician could feel confident he would not be held
liable for unconscious copying if he reviewed recent radio hits and
heard nothing similar; to be confident of avoiding liability under Three
Boys, a musician today would need to review songs released in the
1980s that did not even crack the Top 100.
Is this the direction in which copyright law should be moving?
Should the law hold authors liable for copyright infringement on the
grounds that they may have been unconsciously influenced by another
work they had perceived a quarter century before? In light of the twin
goals of copyright law-to incentivize creative expression and to
enable authors to protect the fruits of their labor-and the growing
body of research on implicit memory, the current approach to
unconscious plagiarism is less than ideal.152
It would be more consistent with the purposes of copyright law
and empirical research on implicit memory for unconscious copying to
function as a defense to liability for copyright infringement. Given the
modern understanding of implicit memory, recognizing an unconscious
copying defense does not render copyright infringement any less of a
strict liability offense than recognizing an independent creation
defense. Affording unconscious copiers protection from liability does
not require inserting a mens rea requirement, or even the good faith
notion Judge Hand addressed in the Fred Fisher opinion, into strict-
liability copyright law. Rather, it simply requires courts to recognize
that an author who creates a work similar to an existing one due
purely to unconscious influence is like an independent creator and has
150. Bright Tunes Music Corp., 420 F. Supp. at 178-79, 181. This case is significantly
different in that Harrison acknowledged his familiarity with the original work, unlike the
composer of "Kalua" in Fred Fisher, Inc., and Michael Bolton in Three Boys Music Corp.
151. Three Boys Music Corp., 212 F.3d at 480-81, 484. The evidence of "reasonable access" in
Three Boys Music Corp. was far more remote than the evidence of "reasonable access" in Fred
Fisher, Inc., and Bright Tunes Music Corp. It appears in this case that both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals may have discretely lightened the plaintiffs burden to demonstrate
reasonable access because the plaintiff argued essentially that the copying was unconscious.
152. I expand on this point in Section V.A infra.
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not actually created a "copy" at all. Recognition of an unconscious
copying defense not only accommodates the modern understanding of
implicit memory, but the analysis below reveals that it also comports
with the economic and moral aims of copyright law. Of course,
allowing an unconscious copying defense creates the potential for
abuse by defendants in infringement suits. Therefore, courts should
allow unconscious copying as a full defense but employ a rebuttable
presumption that all copying is conscious.
An unconscious copying defense could be treated either as a
subset of the independent creation defense or as an entirely separate,
new defense to copyright liability. It would operate as follows: A
defendant in a copyright infringement suit is free to raise the defense
just like an independent creation defense. If a defendant invokes the
defense, then she must prove that the copying was unconscious by
providing evidence of her independent, creative processes, like that
provided by George Harrison in Bright Tunes, and evidence of
particular comments or discussions during creation that demonstrate
a lack of awareness of copying. The rebuttable presumption protects
the defense from potential abuse: If a defendant can offer no proof that
she copied unconsciously, then she is liable as a conscious copier. The
goal is to deter excessive use of the defense as a time-consuming and
resource-wasting "Hail Mary" by copyright defendants. Courts should
require an extensive account of the defendant's creative process,
perhaps along the lines of the forty-plus pages of transcripts the court
described in Bright Tunes, accompanied by the corroboration of others,
to establish sufficiently that copying is unconscious. If the defendant
produces enough evidence to overcome the presumption that she
consciously copied the plaintiffs work, the defendant is not liable for
copyright infringement.
The law would benefit from the recognition of an unconscious
copying defense subject to a rebuttable presumption that copying is
conscious. A careful comparison of the rebuttable presumption
approach to the current approach supports this claim. This Part
evaluates both the way copyright law currently treats unconscious
plagiarism and the proposed alternative according to four criteria: how
well each system (1) advances the economic objectives of copyright
law, (2) advances the moral objectives of copyright law, (3) comports
with a thorough understanding of implicit memory, and (4) copes with
administrative burden. This evaluation reveals that, if the rebuttable
presumption approach is sufficiently administrable, it is a move in the
right direction in addressing the problem of unconscious copying.
1925
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A. Evaluating the Current Approach
The current approach to unconscious copying is to treat it
exactly like conscious copying. 153 Unconscious copiers are liable for
copyright infringement, and the independent creation defense does not
offer protection. 154 This approach undercuts the economic and,
arguably, moral objectives of copyright law. This approach also seems
to sell short (if not dismiss outright) the influence of implicit memory
on creative processes. The advantage of the current approach,
however, is that it creates a bright-line rule that is easy to understand
and easy to administer.
1. Incentivizing Creativity
The practice of holding unconscious copiers liable for copyright
infringment creates a disincentive for authors engaging in creative
expression. The law cannot deter truly unconscious copying because it
is, by definition, unknown to the copying author. Therefore, every time
an author produces a creative expression, that author assumes some
risk of copyright liability. This risk, for practical purposes, is beyond
the author's control. The author cannot know whether she has been
influenced unconsciously by another work and cannot be aware of the
extent of any unconscious influence. For example, assume that twenty
percent of creative expressions in a given author's field are the result
of unconscious copying. 155 Further, assume that five percent of all
instances of unconscious copying are significant enough that the
plaintiff holding the copyright notices the similarities, brings an
infringement claim, and wins the suit. This means that each time a
creator produces a new work she exposes herself to a one-percent
chance of copyright liability. If average liability for copyright
infringement in the author's field is $100,000, then the author has to
factor in an expected loss of $1,000156 for copyright liability each time
she decides whether to create. Precise numbers aside, each time an
author decides whether to create a work, the author must weigh some
negative value against her expected return on creation as the result of
the current approach to unconscious copying. This negative value will
have a chilling effect on creative expression.
153. Arewa, supra note 62, at 479-81.
154. Supra note 145.
155. The twenty percent figure is debatable. Again, it is purely for the sake of an example,
and the actual percentage could be drastically higher or lower.
156. If an author has a one percent chance of losing $100,000 in an infringement suit, then
the author's expected loss due to copyright infringement is $1,000 (0.01 x $100,000).
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2. Moral Fairness
Holding unconscious copiers liable as though they are
conscious, deliberate copiers is not morally fair. According to the
moral justification of copyright law, an author's rights arise as the
result of her labor. While the current approach clearly protects the
moral rights of original, independent authors, unconscious copiers
arguably put the same creative efforts into their creations as the
original authors, 157 and therefore ought to have comparable rights
from a moral perspective. The current approach simply does not
account for this.
Additionally, the moral justification of copyright law
emphasizes that copying causes harm to original authors.158 People
generally are more forgiving of inadvertent harmful behavior, as is
reflected in everyday situations (if John knocks Tory over as she walks
on the sidewalk, one of the first things she will want to know is
whether John's action was deliberate), in sports (intentional fouls are
punished more severely in basketball, for instance), and in the law
(mens rea requirements in criminal law take account of defendants'
mental states). Similarly, it may be appropriate for copyright law to
treat deliberate copiers differently than unconscious copiers.
Arguably, courts already acknowledge this principle, as courts
sometimes use their discretion to reduce statutory damages due to a
copier's innocent intent. It is important to note, though, that the
recognition of this distinction under the current approach is entirely
in courts' discretion.
3. Recognizing Implicit Memory
The core of the current approach to unconscious copying was
established before psychologists were conducting sophisticated
research on implicit memory. 159 While judges have acknowledged the
possibility that copiers may copy only unconsciously, the practice of
treating unconscious copiers no differently than deliberate copiers
does not truly respect the problem of unconscious copying. Now that
substantial empirical research suggests that implicit memories may
influence our behavior in a wide variety of settings, the current
approach does not seem to comport with the empirical realities of
157. Unless the process of creating via unconscious plagiarism takes less time or mental
energy than something more akin to creation "from scratch."
158. Gordon, supra note 33, at 1544-45.
159. See Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (Hand, J.)
(treating unconscious copying as the legal equivalent of deliberate copying).
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memory. In fact, to square the imposition of liability on unconscious
copiers with the goals of copyright, it seems that one must discount or
completely dismiss any impact implicit memory may have on authors.
If cases of truly unconscious copying driven by processes like implicit
memory exist, holding such copiers liable is inconsistent with the
purposes of copyright. The current approach either suffers from this
inconsistency or does not consider that such cases may exist.
4. Administrative Burden
The biggest advantage to treating unconscious plagiarism in
the same manner as deliberate plagiarism is that it results in easily
administrable law. As the law exists now, judges can apply a bright-
line rule. If a plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant copied his
work, either by direct evidence or by convincing a court to infer
copying based on reasonable access and substantial similarity, then
the defendant is liable for copyright infringement regardless of
whether the act was conscious. A bright-line rule is particularly
appealing in the context of distinguishing conscious from unconscious
copying; it would be extremely difficult for a court to credibly and
authoritatively decide this question in a given case. Any attempt to
make such a determination likely would require an extensive record
regarding the defendant's creative processes. If unconscious copying
were grounds for a defense, it would inflate the record in cases in
which it was raised, although it is important to remember that much
of the evidence of unconscious copying may already be raised in regard
to access or independent creation. Critics may argue that, if
unconscious copying stood as a defense, it would be raised in virtually
all copyright infringement cases. However, the rebuttable
presumption approach attempts to address this problem.
B. Evaluating the Rebuttable Presumption Approach
Recognizing unconscious copying as a defense to copyright
infringement liability serves the incentivizing and, arguably, the
moral aims of copyright better than the current law. Further, this
approach comports with research demonstrating the influences of
implicit memory. The potential tradeoff comes in the form of increased
administrative burden, although the likely extent of this burden is
debatable. The use of the rebuttable presumption that copying is
conscious may decrease the administrative burden of recognizing the
defense.
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1. Incentivizing Creativity
The rebuttable presumption approach to unconscious copying
eliminates the disincentive to create that exists under the current
approach. The current approach to unconscious plagiarism creates an
uncontrollable risk of copyright liability for an author each time she
creates a new work. 160 This risk of losing money through copyright
liability decreases the expected value associated with creative
expression and may, therefore, have a chilling effect on creative
expression. 161 If courts instead employ the rebuttable presumption
approach to unconscious copying, the chilling effect resulting from risk
of liability decreases and the incentive to create increases. That
unconscious copiers face no liability ideally would assure any creator
that, barring conscious copying, she will not face liability for copyright
infringement. Because the conscious decision whether to copy is
within the discretion and control of the creator, creators could know
with certainty whether, and control the risk that, they will infringe.
There is still, of course, some risk: the fact that an author's copying
truly is unconscious does not protect the author from a (potentially
expensive) copyright suit in the first place, and there is always the
risk that an unconscious copier will be found liable erroneously.
Because of these considerations, there remains some risk of
infringement associated with any creative expression; however, this
risk in the rebuttable presumption regime is less than that in the
current regime.
Lastly, critics may argue that preventing authors from
recovering for unconscious infringement may weaken original authors'
incentive to create in the first place. However, it is unlikely that such
a minimal risk will deter authors: copyright defendants already have
reason to bring up the sort of evidence necessary for an unconscious
copying defense when arguing for independent creation or innocent
infringement, yet the issue rarely comes up. Furthermore, the
rebuttable presumption that copying is conscious is targeted at
keeping the number of cases where an unconscious copying defense
succeeds relatively small, so any impact on the incentives of original
authors likewise should be small. Overall, under the rebuttable
presumption approach, an original author gains more in terms of
expected value (through her reduced risk of liability for unconscious
copying) than she loses (through the risk of others unconsciously
copying her work without liability).





Lessened liability for unconscious copiers is consistent with
principles of moral fairness, at least with respect to the unconscious
copier. The reasons the current approach is not morally fair work in
the opposite direction if courts treat unconscious copying as a valid
defense. According to the moral justification of copyright law, authors
earn rights in their works through the labor they invest in them.
Truly unconscious copiers go through essentially the same creative
process to produce their works as independent creators. 162 Therefore,
it follows that they should be entitled to rights in the products of their
labor, or at least to protection from liability for infringement.1 63 The
rebuttable presumption approach to unconscious copying accounts for
this, and the current approach does not.
Again, the moral justification of copyright law emphasizes that
copying causes harm to original authors, 64 and people are generally
more forgiving of those who cause harm unintentionally. Truly
unconscious copying falls into the class of inadvertent or accidental
conduct, so it may be appropriate to reduce liability of unconscious
copiers relative to deliberate copiers. In fact, courts already sometimes
use their discretion to reduce statutory damages due to copiers'
innocent intent, and this practice suggests that moral
blameworthiness has at least some relevance to copyright law.1 65 By
addressing the effect of unconscious copying on damages through a
standard defense rather than leaving it in courts' discretion, the
rebuttable presumption approach provides a more formal and
permanent embodiment of these moral principles in copyright. This
approach also may lead to more uniform application of the law.
Critics of the rebuttable presumption approach may object,
expressing concern for the moral rights of the original author. The
original author did, after all, do something to inspire the copier's work
in an unconscious copying scenario; therefore, the original author
should be reimbursed. This is a strong criticism. One response is that,
since the copying is not deliberate conduct and the copier is the one
162. This assumes that creation resulting from implicit memory of unconscious copying is
not any quicker or easier than standard creative processes.
163. Even if unconscious copying provides some advantage-is somewhat quicker and easier
than standard creation-the proposed treatment of unconscious copying does not provide
identical treatment for unconscious copiers and independent creators. Independent creators are
entitled to copyright protection for their original work. Unconscious copiers, in the approach I've
proposed, are merely avoiding liability for infringement.
164. Gordon, supra note 33, at 1544-45.
165. Neal & Iverson, supra note 12, at 305.
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facing liability, the interests of the copier should trump the interests
of the copyright holder. Another response is that unconscious copying
is completely equivalent to (or part of) independent creation,166 and
original authors do not receive any damages based on their moral
rights in the independent creation context. Others may disagree with
these responses. Even so, in the big picture, this criticism should not
defeat the rebuttable presumption approach. Even if, because of the
moral rights of the original author, the "moral fairness" factor favors
the current approach, the copyright system of the United States
focuses far more heavily on incentivizing creativity than on authors'
moral rights. 167 Thus, the "incentivizing creativity" factor, which
demonstrably favors the rebuttable presumption approach, outweighs
the closer "moral fairness" factor in the context of American copyright
law. Alternatively, perhaps the defense of unconscious copying could
operate as a partial and not a full defense, such that the original
author receives something for his influence without placing too much
of a burden on the unconscious copier.
3. Recognizes Implicit Memory
The rebuttable presumption approach does a better job of
recognizing and comporting with the reality of implicit memory.
Allowing unconscious copying as a defense respects the bulk of the
research on implicit memory, giving proper weight to the proposition
that sometimes people may be influenced by works without being
aware of the source of the influence. The use of a rebuttable
presumption limits the number of cases in which a theory of
unconscious copying is advanced, which undercuts some of the
credibility of implicit memory research. If no presumption is
employed, however, then the psychological realities of implicit memory
may be disregarded in the opposite way: everyone facing a copyright
infringement claim simply will claim unconscious copying, even if they
have no plausible claim or significant evidence to support them. So,
while it may be the case that some truly unconscious copiers are held
liable for want of evidence sufficient to overcome the rebuttable
presumption, this approach still affords more weight to implicit
memory research than the current regime while also offering more
consistency with the purposes of copyright.
166. That is, perhaps unconscious influence is sufficiently widespread in creative processes
that it cannot be meaningfully distinguished from "independent creation."





The strongest objections to the rebuttable presumption
approach highlight the potentially sizeable administrative burden it
may create. Specifically, critics may argue that the negative impact
resulting from abandoning the administrable, bright-line rule of the
current approach outweighs the advantages of this approach with
respect to incentivizing creativity and moral fairness. First, the
rebuttable presumption approach requires courts to weigh evidence
about whether an act of copying was conscious or unconscious. This
distinction is not easy to make. The additional evidence necessary for
this determination may create excessively lengthy records, and
defendants may use bogus testimony or evidence to support their
unconscious copying claims. Also problematic is the possibility that
almost all copyright defendants may attempt to use the unconscious
copying defense (most of them disingenuously), such that the extra
litigation over the conscious/unconscious distinction drains judicial
resources and lessens efficiency.
While these concerns are legitimate, there is also good reason
to believe that the rebuttable presumption approach would not cause
severe administrative problems. First, the use of the rebuttable
presumption that copying is conscious will take care of some cases by
itself. The rebuttable presumption eliminates the need to litigate
unconsciousness of copying in a subset of infringement cases: the
presumption will prove too much for defendants who can offer no
evidence at all that their copying occurred unconsciously and will
deter those who do not want to waste their money and resources on a
long shot. It seems patently unlikely that conscious copiers will go to
great lengths to document an elaborate farce of a "creative process" to
create evidence in support of an unconscious copying defense in an
eventual copyright infringement suit. Furthermore, defendants
already have some reason to introduce evidence that their copying was
unconscious: while courts have held that unconscious infringement
still is infringement, "innocent intent ... can reduce the amount of
damages, especially statutory damages." 168 Additionally, the evidence
introduced to support the defense of unconscious copying would
overlap almost entirely with the evidence currently necessary to
support the independent creation defense. 169 Thus, in cases where
168. Neal & Iverson, supra note 12, at 305.
169. See, e.g., Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 486 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing
the independent creation defense); Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F.
Supp. 177, 180-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (listing the elements of subconscious copying).
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defendants argue independent creation, the record would not be
significantly inflated if defendants also raise unconscious copying as a
defense. Evidence of unconscious copying may also overlap with
evidence introduced regarding access. The degree to which the
rebuttable presumption approach would render the law less
administrable is open for debate and will not be known unless there is
empirical evidence of the way defendants actually react to the change.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the imposition of liability for copyright infringement on
deliberate copiers makes intuitive sense and is consistent with the
economic and moral principles underlying copyright law, the picture is
less clear with respect to unconscious copying. Currently, the law
treats unconscious copying no differently from deliberate copying; both
subject the copier to liability for copyright infringement. On the whole,
this approach to unconscious copying works against copyright law's
primary objective of incentivizing creative expression and, arguably,
its secondary aim of protecting authors' moral rights.
This Note proposes an alternative approach to unconscious
copying: Allow unconscious copying to function as a defense to
copyright infringement, but require defendants to overcome a
rebuttable presumption of consciousness. This approach does not
require the use of mens rea or good faith requirements, but it is
analogous to the independent creation defense in that it recognizes
that defendants that fall within its scope have not created a "copy" at
all. This approach does a better job of furthering the economic and
moral objectives of copyright law.
The rebuttable presumption approach is, however, just one
possible way to resolve the inconsistency between the aims of
copyright law and its treatment of unconscious copying. Other
solutions can be devised. 170 The risk of liability for unconscious
copying could be influenced through changes to other elements of
copyright law. For instance, increasing the size of the public domain
would result in less potential for unconscious copyright infringement,
as it would be more probable that the unconsciously copied work
would fall in the public domain. Another approach is to provide
authors an opportunity to examine other copyrighted sources before
their own copyrights vest, which may allow them to review their
influences and note their own unconscious copying before incurring
170. See Arewa, supra note 62, at 544-56 (discussing a variety of potential changes to
copyright law to allow artists to create with less fear of infringement liability).
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liability. This Note does not endorse these alternatives but highlights
that there is a variety of tools that can be used to limit the cases in
which unconscious copiers face liability for infringement.
Liability for unconscious copying creates an inconsistency
between copyright law in practice and its theoretical underpinnings.
The less often unconscious copiers face liability for infringement, the
closer copyright law adheres to its guiding utilitarian and moral
principles, and the better copyright law is for it.
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